State repression of Iran’s ethnic minorities, which have been demanding greater recognition of their cultural and political rights, has intensified in recent years. With potentially hostile foreign military forces stationed in countries to the east and west of Iran, the authorities have become increasingly wary of minority communities, many of whom, such as the Iranian Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis, are concentrated in border areas. In certain of these areas, armed groups are active, some of which commit human rights abuses.

In particular, a Baluchi armed group called Jondallah, also known as the Iranian Peoples’ Resistance Movement, has mounted several attacks since 2005, including armed assaults (some lethal) on officials and members of the security forces, hostage-taking and the killing of hostages. Other attacks targeting civilians have been attributed to Jondallah by the authorities, although Jondallah has denied responsibility. In response, Iranian security forces have carried out arrests of suspected militants and obtained “confessions” from them using torture, some of which have been shown on television, and committed unlawful killings. New judicial procedures have been introduced which further undermine the right to a fair trial, and there has been an increase in the use of the death penalty, marked by a huge rise in the numbers of executions of ethnic Baluchis.

Amnesty International condemns in all circumstances attacks by armed groups that deliberately target civilians, as well as hostage-taking, indiscriminate attacks and other abuses. It calls for those who commit such abuses to be brought to justice through fair trials and without recourse to the death penalty.

Amnesty International also urges governments not to respond to human rights abuses with further abuses. Governments have a duty to take measures to safeguard the public and protect people from violent attacks, but when doing so they must adhere to their obligations under international law and not use methods that flout human rights.

At a time when world attention on Iran is focused on the country’s nuclear programme, with sanctions in place and the possibility of military intervention, there is a danger that serious human rights issues may disappear from the international agenda. As an independent human rights organization, Amnesty International generally takes no position on the imposition of sanctions or on military action, but is concerned that at times of heightened international tension, as now exists in relation to Iran, there is a danger both that human rights violations increase and that when Amnesty International and other organizations draw attention to them this can be exploited to further agendas unrelated to the protection and promotion of human rights. Amnesty International’s role, however, is to be an impartial defender of human rights across the globe, and it documents and reports on human rights violations as part of its campaigning and other efforts to end such violations and obtain redress for the victims.

This report focuses on human rights violations committed against Baluchis, one of Iran’s ethnic minority communities, and follows a report about the situation of Iran’s Ahwazi Arab community issued in May 2006.^{^[1]} Many of the concerns and individual cases detailed in this report were included in a detailed letter which Amnesty International addressed to Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, Iran’s Minister of Defence, in December 2006. Subsequently, Amnesty International raised further cases with the Iranian authorities in July and August 2007. No response to any of these communications had been received at time of writing. Unfortunately, the Iranian authorities rarely respond to Amnesty International’s interventions. The authorities have not permitted the organization to visit Iran in order to assess human rights situation at first hand for more than 28 years, since shortly after the Islamic Revolution in February 1979.

Amnesty International is greatly concerned about the rise in human rights violations against members of the Baluchi minority and is calling on the Iranian authorities to take urgent steps to end abuses and respect human rights. In particular, they should end arbitrary arrests and torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, and bring to justice those members of the security forces and officials responsible for torture; ensure that all those accused of crimes receive fair trials and end the use of the death penalty. They should also review the security provisions in place in Iran’s Baluchi minority areas to ensure they do not facilitate the commission of human rights violations, and end discrimination against Baluchis in law and practice. They should also give particular attention to violations against women and girls by taking steps to end trafficking of girls and women and to improve access to education by girls and women.

Amnesty International is also calling on Jondallah to desist immediately from carrying out human rights abuses, including indiscriminate attacks, hostage-taking and the killing of hostages.

2. The Baluchi community in Iran

Iran’s Baluchi minority is believed to constitute one to three per cent of the country’s total population of around 70 million.^{^[2]} Most ethnic Baluchis live in Sistan-Baluchistan province, with smaller numbers in Kerman province. However, Baluchis have migrated elsewhere in Iran, particularly Tehran, to find work. Many have strong tribal and family ties to Baluchi populations in neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan and several hundred thousand are believed to have migrated to find work in other Gulf countries. Baluchis in Iran mostly speak Baluchi as a first language, with a minority speaking Brahoui. Most are Sunni Muslims, although the majority (around 90 per cent) of Iranians are Shi’a. An estimated 20,000 of the 1.7 million inhabitants of Sistan-Baluchistan province are said to be nomads.^{^[3]}

2.1 Economic and cultural discrimination

Sistan-Baluchistan is one of the poorest and most deprived provinces in Iran. In recent years it has suffered severe drought and extreme weather conditions, which have placed further strain on the province’s resources. It has Iran’s worst indicators for life expectancy, adult literacy, primary school enrolment, access to improved water and sanitation, and infant and

child mortality.^{^[4]}

Women and girls

Baluchi women and girls face particular problems accessing education and health care. Early marriage of girls, often when they are as young as 12, is common. In 2002, the minimum age for voluntary marriage of girls was raised from 9 to 13, but parents can still apply to the courts for approval for marriages of girls who are below the age of 13. In considering the Second Periodic report submitted by Iran in 2005, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted “the increase in the age of marriage for girls from 9 to 13 years (while that of boys remains at 15) and is seriously concerned at the very low minimum ages and the related practice of forced, early and temporary marriages.”^{^[5]} The Committee went on to recommend that Iran, “take the necessary steps to prevent and combat forced, early and temporary marriages.”^{^[6]}

Although primary schooling from 6 to 11 is free and compulsory, school enrolment rates in the province are 71.5 per cent for girls and 81.8 per cent for boys, well below the national average[7]. The primary reasons for families deciding to keep girls at home include the long distances between schools and the isolated Baluchi communities, a lack of female teachers, the relatively high level of poverty which leads to children being kept out of school to work, and cultural attitudes which place less value on education for a girl than for a boy. For example, UNICEF has found that:

“few teachers are willing to serve in sparsely populated rural and nomadic areas. This means that many of the teachers are men on military service – and are thus considered unsuitable by families living there. In addition, owing to the lack of not only school buildings but also teachers, some classes are multi grade, co-educational and take place outside.

Negative attitudes towards female education continue to exist in these areas too. Some families still view girls as better engaged in housekeeping and child care activities. Whilst they may allow their daughters to go to primary school nearby, they are reluctant to let them travel long distances to reach secondary school”.^{^[8]}

Under its development plans, the Iranian authorities have been working with organizations like UNICEF to try to improve the access of girls to school in deprived areas such as Sistan-Baluchistan with some very positive results. According to UNICEF:

“dozens of female assistant teachers were recruited from the community and trained to teach subjects such as hygiene, basic mathematics and science, literacy, life-skills education, school preparatory activities and storytelling. Training was also given to teachers on how to facilitate peer education, multi-grade classes and activity-based teaching. In order to enhance community participation, weekly after-school classes were held in villages with groups of young girls already enrolled in the school system supervising the activities. The results have been astounding: girls’ enrolment in primary school increased nearly threefold in one year.

“Now that there are more female teachers, the situation for girls has improved a lot,” says Mehri Maleki Meshkini, a young teacher, who dresses in the traditional black chador. ‘In our classes we try to discuss serious issues like early marriage, so that the girls become more aware of the situation. But it is difficult because the men in the family decide everything.[9]

The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, who visited Iran in January-February 2005, stated in her January 2006 report that women from minorities experienced multiple forms of discrimination, but noted that the government did not accept this. She also highlighted the issue of trafficking in girls and women, stating that “[m]ost of the trafficking is said to occur in the eastern provinces and mainly in border towns with Pakistan and Afghanistan [which are mainly Baluchi areas] where women are kidnapped, bought or entered into temporary marriage in order to be sold into sexual slavery in other countries”.

The Iranian authorities have taken some steps to address the problem of trafficking of girls and women. In August 2004, the Law on Combating Human Trafficking was passed which specifically criminalizes trafficking in persons in Iran. In some cases, people involved in trafficking, including some operating through Sistan-Baluchistan province, have been tried and convicted.[10]

In her recommendations the Special Rapporteur urged the government to “provide special programmes for women from minority groups who suffer multiple forms of discrimination” and to “ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and protect women victims of trafficking, ensure accountability of the traffickers and provide compensation to the victims”.^{^[11]}

Violent storms in the province in June 2007 led to widespread flooding and destruction of homes and property, reportedly killing at least 23 people^{^[12]} and leaving thousands of others at risk of disease because of lack of clean drinking water and adequate housing. Some Baluchis complained that the authorities did not provide disaster relief and that the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to offer adequate help until a local Sunni religious leader had criticized them during Friday prayer sermons.^{^[13]} Another Sunni leader, Mowlavi Isa Amiri, the Friday prayer leader of the city of Chabahar, was reported as saying

“The honourable governor-general is saying that nothing has happened, whereas a natural disaster and a crisis has occurred and the humanitarian problem has taken on an ethnic character. Is the death of 25 (sic) people, 80 per cent fatalities among livestock and 95 per cent damage to farmland nothing? How is it that neither national TV nor even the provincial TV are providing any kind of adequate news coverage of this tragedy? If your helicopter was unable to fly, why didn't you give petrol to private boats so that the people themselves could rush to the aid of the flood victims?'”^{^[14]}

Iran’s Constitution as well as several international human rights treaties to which Iran is party -- including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) -- all clearly prohibit discrimination on grounds of ethnicity. Despite this, Baluchis say they have suffered systematic discrimination by the Iranian authorities both under the Pahlavi monarchy which ended with the fall of the Shah and throughout the period since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. ^{^[15]}

A practice that has led to discrimination against Baluchis and other minority groups is gozinesh -- an ideological selection procedure that requires state officials and employees to demonstrate, among other things, allegiance to Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the concept of velayat-e faqih (Rule of the Jurisconsult), which is the political basis of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In law and practice, this process impairs – on grounds of political opinion, previous political affiliation or support or religious affiliation – equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation for all those who seek employment in the public and parastatal sector (such as the Bonyads or Foundations) and, reportedly, in some instances in parts of the private sector. Access to further education may also be subject to gozinesh scrutiny.^{^[16]} Under gozinesh rules, non-Shi’a Iranians are excluded from certain state positions such as that of President. Molavi Ali Akbar Mollazadeh, a Baluchi cleric, described in 1997 the impact of gozinesh on Baluchis in Baluchi-majority areas such as Sistan-Baluchistan province:

“If a Baluchi wants to open a shop, he must first go to the government and get his political beliefs thoroughly examined by the Pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] and the intelligence services. They ask: have you done anything for the Islamic Republic? Did you fight in the Iraq-Iran war? Do you believe in the Velayat-e faghih? Sunnis don't believe in the Velayat-e faghih -- it is against our beliefs, and because we don't believe in taqiyah,^{^[17]} which we consider to be lying, we must answer the truth. The result is that Sunnis don't get the permit to open the shop, they don't get jobs, they don't get places in the university - unless they agree to become informers for the intelligence services. Out of 5,000 students at Baluchistan University in Zahedan, there are only 10 or 15 Baluchis. Even the education law of the Islamic Republic says that 75 per cent should be Baluchis -- and now, 99 per cent are non-Baluchi. They treat us like the Untouchables in India.”^{^[18]}

He also complained about an official policy to resettle members of other ethnic groups in the area, which he said was aimed at reducing the proportion of Baluchis locally:

“We are Iranians by passport and by nation, and so we want our rights as Iranians. We want our rights in Baluchistan… We want to be allowed to work, to have our own people in the police. We don't want them to bring people from Tehran who are enemies of our people as police and to run the entire administration. They give all the jobs to their own people. By the Constitution, if you are not a Shia you cannot be a Minister. If they make a factory, they give the job to their relatives and to their own people. They bring in hundreds of thousands of people, to make them a majority in Baluchistan and in Kurdistan. They are not actually sending Baluchis out, but they are pushing them out by these discriminatory policies. There are now 200,000 Baluchis working in Gulf countries, because they can't get jobs in Baluchistan.^{^[19]}

After the election of President Khatami in1997, Baluchi participation in higher education appeared to increase and some Baluchis gained employment in state-run institutions. However, after the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005, many Baluchis were reported to have been forced from their jobs in a widespread purge of government employees. When questioned about this in March 2007, the Majles (parliament) member for Zahedan, Hossein Ali Shahryari, denied it and said that under former President Khatami, there had been only one Sunni [city] governor as well as a Sunni deputy governor-general and several directors-general, whereas there were now 14 Sunni managers in the province.^{^[20]}

Some Baluchis have claimed that there is an official policy to dilute Iran’s ethnic minorities by dispossessing them of their ancestral lands, providing incentives for them to move away, and encouraging other groups to take their place. Baluchi sources claimed in the 1990s that this policy had escalated following serious riots in February 1994 in Zahedan after the destruction of a Sunni mosque in Mashhad, allegedly for city planning purposes^{^[21]}, which were reportedly quelled by Revolutionary Guards firing live ammunition into the crowd. For example, in May 1995, Revolutionary Guards are alleged to have attacked villagers in Sorvdar and Zardkoh in the Iranshahr district, forcibly displacing them to a desert area.^{^[22]} Similar claims have been made by other ethnic minorities in Iran, notably the Ahwazi Arabs.^{^[23]} The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that forced internal displacement is a violation of the right to freedom of movement and to choose a place of residence.^{^[24]}

More recently, minority groups have suggested that certain statements by government officials are evidence of a secret policy of “Persianization”. For example, they point to remarks reportedly made by Majles Speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel on 22 November 2006 when commenting on President Mahmoud Ahmdadinejad’s call for an increase in Iran’s population to 120 million:

“The President believes that family planning should not be the same all around the country. The President’s concerns in this regard should be taken into consideration … We should see the underlying thought within the President’s discourse. We should come to the conclusion that geographical equilibria should be taken into consideration in family planning.”[25]

In May 2007, the Minister of the Interior stated when discussing security related issues that “Pirsuran region, which was the special zone for smugglers and terrorists, is now cleansed and 700 hectares of Tasuki region has now turned into farmland.”[26]

In other cases, Baluchi houses have reportedly been demolished, particularly in the port city of Chabahar. On 30 June 2005, an unspecified number of Baluchis are reported to have been forcibly evicted and made homeless in Chabahar when their huts were demolished by security forces. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development had apparently allocated the land for housing for the security forces^{^[27]}. During clashes with the forces carrying out the forced eviction and home demolition, several people protesting against the destruction of their homes were reportedly injured. Those who were forcibly evicted do not appear to have been offered alternative housing. Their subsequent fate is unknown. One evicted resident, Mahgani Bahok declared that she and her children had lost everything and had been left with nowhere to seek shelter.^{^[28]}

Since Amnesty International is not permitted access to Iran, the organization is not able to verify reports of discrimination and other human rights violations at first hand; however, it notes that information from sources such as UN human rights mechanisms is generally consistent with the information obtained and received by Amnesty International.

For example, in his March 2006 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, who visited Iran in July-August 2005, expressed concern regarding “ the continued discrimination faced by ethnic and religious minorities and nomadic groups, as reflected in the disproportionately poor housing and living conditions of these groups; the considerable number of alleged cases of land confiscation and forced evictions; discrimination against women with respect to housing rights, land, inheritance and property; and the poor and limited quantity and quality of basic services provided to informal settlements and poor neighbourhoods”^{^[29]} (which are often filled with rural migrants, many of whom come from ethnic minorities).

The Special Rapporteur pointed to the apparent discriminatory nature or impact of forced evictions from informal neighbourhoods and expropriation of rural land for large-scale agricultural plantations or petrochemical plants, stating that:

“[i]n some regions, these expropriations seem to have targeted disproportionately property and land of religious and ethnic minorities, …[including]…houses. No participatory process or consultation has taken place before the decision by relevant authorities to evacuate the area. The expropriations are considered a form of land confiscation by the affected population, particularly since prices paid in return for land are considerably lower than market values.”^{^[30]}

He also noted that while the provision of basic services, including to rural areas, appeared reasonable in most cases, he was “disturbed by the fact that … exceptions seemed to disproportionately affect predominantly minority neighbourhoods and provinces, clearly constituting discrimination”^{^[31]}. In his concluding remarks and recommendations, he made several recommendations specifically relating to minorities. He indicated that the Iranian authorities should end forced evictions, and should allocate budget resources to historically marginalized provinces, including Sistan-Baluchistan, in order to assist the realization of human rights in these areas, including the provision of civic services, such as adequate housing, access to utilities and basic infrastructure, to people and communities in those regions^{^[32]}.

Although a number of Baluchi cultural organizations and centres do exist, most established during the presidency of Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami, they have reportedly not found it easy to exercise their cultural rights. For example, Amnesty International is aware of organizations such as the Voice of Justice Young People’s Society^{^[33]} in Zahedan, the Baluchi Song Institute in Iranshahr, the Kavir Future Makers Young People’s Society in Gosht-Saravan, the Mokranzamin School of the Learned in Saravan, and the Green Palm Young People’s Society in Nikshahr, among others. However, Amnesty International has also received reports that such organizations have experienced difficulties in obtaining permits to hold Baluchi cultural events. For example, in June 2005 the Voice of Justice Young People’s Society was only granted permission after some difficulty to stage the first Baluchi music concert in the province. Another group tried to organize a similar concert in 2006, but permission was refused by the authorities. The first university-based Baluchi music concert in Zahedan University took place only in May 2006 after the Baluchi students who organized it finally persuaded university officials to let it go ahead.

Members of the Baluchi minority have also faced difficulties in exercising their rights to use their own language, despite the requirement in international law that persons belonging to minorities be allowed to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination. States are prohibited from denying an individual the right to use his or her own language.^{^[34]}

Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution states:

“The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text‑books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.”

All state schooling in Baluchi areas, which is free and compulsory at the primary and middle (“guidance”) stages (between 6 and 13), is conducted exclusively in Persian. Although private schools have been permitted to operate since 1988, none are known to teach in Baluchi. The Ministry of Education is responsible for the supervision of the curriculum and the production of text books. At the compulsory levels, these are believed to be available solely in Persian, in accordance with the Constitution.

The first time that Baluchi publications were allowed was after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The following year, however, the government closed down three Baluchi-language publications that had emerged: Mahtak, Graand and Roshanal.^{^[35]} Baluchi publications resumed in the 1990s and there are at least two bilingual Persian-Baluchi publications, one in Zahedan and another in Iranshahr.^{^[36]} In addition, the bilingual Marze Porgohar is reportedly published in Tehran, although since its inception the paper has reportedly periodically been suspended. In 2004, Baluchi students at Zahedan University were granted a licence to publish a bilingual newsletter Istun; the first issue of which appeared in October 2004^{^[37]}. Chabahar is said to have a Baluchi bookshop, selling material in Baluchi mainly imported from Pakistan. There is also reported to be limited programming in Baluchi on state radio, but no programming in Baluchi on state-run provincial television, which apparently counts only one Baluchi staff member among its broadcasters.

Some members of the Baluchi minority are involved in criminal activity, notably drug-smuggling from Afghanistan and Pakistan, both as a route towards the West and to supply Iran’s rapidly growing population of drug-users.^{^[38]} Most of the drug-smuggling is done by well-organized gangs, although there is a reported increase in the number of individuals who are carrying small amounts across the borders.^{^[39]} Baluchi activists claim that economic deprivation leaves their community with few alternatives to involvement in smuggling.^{^[40]} The Iranian authorities are co-operating with the international community in attempts to curb the activities of drug-smugglers. Among other projects, a 10 feet high and three feet thick wall is being built along 700 km of Iran’s eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Taftan and Mand. Baluchis, including in Pakistan, have criticised the project, claiming it will make it more difficult for Baluchis to maintain their family ties and conduct legitimate economic activities across the border. The authorities have pointed to gaps in the wall where “easement rights” can be maintained. There are also believed to be landmines along the eastern border and in February 2006 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “Due to our expansive [sic] borders and problems resulting from narcotics and terrorist trafficking, our defense institutions are considering the use of landmines as a defensive mechanism.”^{^[41]}

Many Baluchis arrested by the authorities are accused of drug-smuggling or armed banditry, both of which can carry the death penalty. It is difficult to know the truth in any individual case, but Baluchi activists say that, in at least some cases, innocent Baluchis are accused of such crimes as a reprisal against the general population for attacks that have occurred against government targets. Out of over 50 executions in 2006 that may have involved Baluchis, at least 19 were reported to have been of drug-offenders or drug-smugglers. The others were mainly convicted of crimes such as armed robbery or banditry, murder or kidnapping.

Economic, social and cultural rights

Iran is a state party to the ICESCR as well as the CRC and the ICERD. These require the immediate prohibition, and steps towards the elimination, of discrimination against minorities in the realization of economic, social and cultural rights -- including the rights to work which is freely chosen, to adequate housing, food and water, to education, to the highest attainable standard of health and to equal participation in cultural life. Reports of huge disparities between minority communities and majority groups in Iran in literacy, access to education, access to clean water and sanitation, as well as reports of “land grabbing” and forced evictions -- a gross violation of human rights, including of the right to adequate housing -- which appear to target minority communities, all suggest that the Iranian authorities are failing to comply with these international obligations.

Iran is also a party to the ICCPR, which in Article 26 upholds equal protection of the law and non-discrimination in the exercise of human rights. The Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has clarified that this extends to all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. The ICCPR, in Article 27, also provides that “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”

In 2003, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated in paragraph 14 of its concluding observations on Iran’s 16^th and 17^th periodic reports:

“The Committee takes note with concern of the reported discrimination faced by certain minorities …who are deprived of certain rights, and that certain provisions of the State party's legislation appear to be discriminatory on both ethnic and religious grounds.”[42]

In its General Comment on forced eviction, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights notes that the obligations of States parties to the Covenant in relation to forced evictions are based on article 11.1, which recognizes the right of “everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”, read in conjunction with other relevant provisions. The Committee draws attention, in particular, to article 2.1 of the ICESCR, which obliges States to use "all appropriate means" to promote the right to adequate housing.

The Committee further notes that ethnic minorities are among those groups which suffer disproportionately from the practice of forced eviction. It reminded governments that the “non-discrimination provisions of articles 2.2 and 3 of … [the ICESCR] impose an additional obligation upon Governments to ensure that, where evictions do occur, appropriate measures are taken to ensure that no form of discrimination is involved.”^{^[43]} The Committee stressed that:

“States parties shall ensure, prior to carrying out any evictions, and particularly those involving large groups, that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to use force. Legal remedies or procedures should be provided to those who are affected by eviction orders. States parties shall also see to it that all the individuals concerned have a right to adequate compensation for any property, both personal and real, which is affected. In this respect, it is pertinent to recall article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires States parties to ensure "an effective remedy" for persons whose rights have been violated and the obligation upon the "competent authorities (to) enforce such remedies when granted".”^{^[44]}

The Committee further considered that:

“…the procedural protections which should be applied in relation to forced evictions include: (a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.^{^[45]}

Persons belonging to minorities cannot be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the right to education. This means not only that they must be granted access to education on a footing of perfect equality with other nationals of the state, but also that they must be granted suitable means to preserve their identity, including their language. While the state provides education in the state’s official language(s) for the majority population, members of minorities have a right to establish and maintain schools where education is provided in their own language.^{^[46]} International law recognizes the right of individuals (including members of minorities) to establish and direct educational institutions, provided that they conform to the minimum educational standards laid down by the state.^{^[47]} Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that is provided to their children;^{^[48]} this includes the right to choose for their children institutions other than those established and maintained by the public authorities.^{^[49]}

State authorities should take positive measures: (a) so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue; and (b) in order to encourage knowledge of the language of the minorities existing within their territory.^{^[50]}

3. Armed opposition: Jondallah

Jondallah, also known as the Iranian Peoples’ Resistance Movement (Jonbesh-e Moqavemat-e Mardom-e Iran), came to attention in 2005 when it took eight Iranian soldiers hostage. Led by Abdolmalek Rigi, aged about 24, and reportedly comprising around 1,000 trained fighters, it appears to operate in Baluchi areas in Iran and to have bases across the border in Pakistan. In the past, Iranian officials have linked Jondallah to al-Qa’ida, but have also claimed that it has links to foreign states, particularly the USA^{^[51]} and the UK^{^[52]}. The Iranian authorities have frequently described Jondallah attacks as being carried out by “armed bandits”.

The aims of Jondallah are not entirely clear, but statements by the group’s leaders have referred to discrimination against Iran’s Baluchi population as a driving force for their actions. For example, Abdolhamid Rigi (Abdul Hameed Reeki) stated in January 2006 that the group would fight for a more democratic government and full rights for Sunnis in Iran. He said that many members had joined after experiencing injustice at first hand; Abdolmalek Rigi’s brother and uncle are said to have been killed in separate encounters with Iranian police.^{^[53]} On 14 May 2006, Abdolmalek Rigi reportedly said that four years previously he had turned to armed opposition against the state as a last resort in order to “protect the national and religious rights of the Baluchis and Sunnis in Baluchistan Province” who had suffered persecution since the 1979 Islamic Revolution^{^[54]}.

In a public statement issued on 20 February 2007, the "People's Resistance Movement of Iran (former Jondallah of Iran), said that it was:

" a defensive organization that has been formed to campaign for freedom and democracy in Iran and to protect the Baloch people and other religious and ethnic minorities. Our mission is to change the present regime and establish a new system in Iran in which every Iranian enjoys equal opportunity and equal rights. We have undertaken to accept the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all other United Nations conventions or resolutions. We only act in self-defence and whenever the Iranian regime kills an innocent Iranian, we act in accordance to all United Nations conventions that allow people and nations to defend themselves against aggression and genocide…We strive to force the Iranian regime to abandon its brutal policies against the Baloch people and other Iranian citizens. We campaign to stop discrimination, brutality, injustice, corruption and ethnic cleansing in Iran”^{^[55]}

The statement denied that the group had any links to foreign governments or Islamic groups such as al-Qa’ida or the Taleban; and it denied that it receives funding, arms or training from foreign sources.

Amnesty International notes, however, that despite Jondallah’s statements regarding its motivation and its claims to comply with international law, it has, by its own admission (see section 3.1 below), carried out gross abuses such as hostage taking, the killing of hostages and attacks against non-military targets such as the Governor's Office in Zahedan. Amnesty International condemns unreservedly hostage-taking, the killing of hostages and torture and ill-treatment, as well as direct attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks, whatever the cause of the perpetrators, and whatever justification they give for their actions. Under international law, and in Amnesty International’s view, nothing can ever justify these actions. They are always unlawful and wrong, and should be ended.

3.1 Attacks by Jondallah

Around 20 Iranian officials have been taken hostage by Jondallah since June 2005, apparently in support of demands that the Iranian authorities should release a number of Jondallah members or other members of Iran’s Baluchi minority from detention or imprisonment. Some were later killed, others were released. Other captured officials have reportedly been summarily killed, giving the lie to Jondallah’s claims to respect human rights.

In 2005 UAE-based Al-Arabiyyah Television reported that Jondallah claimed to have captured an Iranian intelligence official, Shehab Mansouri, on 20 June 2005. On 12 July, the group was said to have distributed a video showing his killing.^{^[56]} In December 2005, shortly after an attack on a motorcade carrying officials^{^[57]} in which two people died, at least eight Iranian policemen were captured by Jondallah.^{^[58]} At least one -- Captain Abbas Namju, believed to be a border guard -- was reportedly killed by the group in January 2006 while the others were later released. Three Turkish nationals were also kidnapped in December 2005 amid reports that Jondallah may have been responsible. The three were later released.^{^[59]}

Jondallah also claimed responsibility for what became known in Iran as the “Tasuki incident”. On 16 March 2006, Jondallah members attacked a convoy of vehicles near the town of Tasuki in the Sistan area, capturing a number of Iranian officials. Some 23 of the officials who were separated out as non-Baluchis were killed by the roadside. Seven others were taken hostage, two of whom -- Ahmad Zahed Shaykhi, a Revolutionary Guards Corps officer and Colonel Hamid Reza Kaveh Birjandi, head of a Special Unit of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (Intelligence),^{^[60]} -- were killed in April and May 2006. Video footage alleged to be of the hostages and their identification cards was sent to al-Jazeera television on 21 March 2006, and further footage apparently depicting the killings of Ahmad Zayed Shaykhi and Colonel Kaveh Birjandi was circulated later. However, Interior Minister Mostafa Purmohammadi denied that the pictures were of the colonel but rather of an “old hostage” who had been killed previously^{^[61]}. Ali Purshamsiyan, Deputy Head of the Iranian Red Crescent Security Department, who was among those taken hostage in the “Tasuki incident,” said in August 2006, after his release, that Ahmad Zahed Shaykhi and Colonel Kaveh Birjandi were alive and still being held as hostages. He said that four other “Tasuki” hostages had also been released.^{^[62]} However, in April 2007, the official Iran newspaper reported that four of the “Tasuki” hostages had been killed, and three released.[63]

Jondallah was also accused of responsibility for another incident on 13 May 2006 when 12 people, all reportedly civilians, were killed in Kerman Province in an attack on the Kerman to Bam road. The attackers, who were wearing police uniforms and Baluchi dress, shot dead 11 people after forcing them to get out of their vehicles, and also killed another person in a passing car that did not stop. They also tied a boy aged 11 or 12 to an electricity pole and forced him to watch the killings. Iranian officials, including Amir Reza Savari, head of the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, and General Eskandar Momeni, Deputy Commander of the Law Enforcement Force, subsequently accused Jondallah of carrying out this attack^{^[64]} but Jondallah denied it. Amnesty International sought clarification from the Iranian authorities in December 2006 regarding any official investigation into this incident, but had received no response by August 2007.

On 14 December 2006, the day before nationwide elections for the Assembly of Experts and local council elections, a bomb in a car exploded in Zahedan outside the office of the Governor-General of Sistan-Baluchistan province, killing the owner of the car, who had reportedly been kidnapped, and slightly damaging the office building. The attack was claimed by Jondallah. Shortly afterwards, another bomb reportedly placed in a rubbish bin exploded outside Zahedan University, injuring a student. Government officials blamed Jondallah but Jondallah denied responsibility.

On 14 February 2007, a car packed with explosives blew up a bus carrying Revolutionary Guardsmen and others, killing at least 14 people and injuring around 30. The attack, which was condemned by UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon [65], was later claimed by Jondallah. The group apparently stated that the attack was in reprisal for the execution of several members of Iran’s Ahwazi Arab minority^{^[66]} convicted after unfair trials of bomb attacks committed in Khuzestan Province in 2005.^{^[67]} Two days later, another bomb exploded in Zahedan without causing injury.

On 27 February 2007, Jondallah took four Iranian policemen hostage following an armed clash between members of the group and security forces in Sistan-Baluchistan province. Three were reportedly freed by Pakistani security forces which raided a building in Buleda, Pakistan, on 23 March 2007. They said the fourth had been killed by Jondallah several days before.^{^[68]}

Amnesty International condemns utterly hostage taking, and the killing of hostages, whether carried out by state forces or armed groups. These are serious violations of international law. The organization also opposes in all cases deliberate attacks on civilians, indiscriminate attacks and disproportionate attacks

Armed groups and international law

Amnesty International’s opposition to abuses by armed groups is rooted in principles and values of respect for human rights and dignity for all and the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). Human rights law generally is not directly applicable to armed groups (who are not parties to human rights treaties). IHL, which can apply directly to armed groups, sets out standards of humane conduct applicable to all parties in armed conflicts. In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the foremost authority on international humanitarian law, “whenever armed force is used the choice of means and methods is not unlimited.” This basic rule is explicitly reflected in a number of international humanitarian law treaties. Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol 2 are the instruments most directly relevant to non-international armed conflict, which is the context in which armed groups usually operate. These treaties increasingly are supplemented by customary international law. The authoritative ICRC study of customary IHL has determined that many of the rules of IHL that were codified for international conflict now apply to non-international conflicts as well. These include the prohibitions on direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.

In situations that fall short of armed conflict, AI calls on armed groups to uphold fundamental principles of humanity derived from IHL. On this basis, AI condemns serious abuses by armed groups including attacks that target civilians, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, torture and other ill-treatment, hostage taking, and the killing of captives.

4. Human rights violations against Baluchis

Although information about the Baluchi areas in Iran has always been difficult to obtain and verify, Amnesty International has documented human rights violations against Baluchis over the years when they have come to the organization’s attention. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, for instance, Amnesty International documented executions of Baluchis after unfair trials. Those executed were usually accused of banditry, drug-smuggling or armed opposition against the Islamic Republic.

A number of Baluchis, including Sunni clerics, have been killed in suspicious circumstances both in Iran and abroad. Similar suspicious deaths of members of other religious minorities or of those opposed to the Iranian authorities point to a pattern of extrajudicial executions by the Iranian authorities^{^[69]}. Two members of the Naroui tribe, Haibat and Dilavar, were shot dead outside their home in Karachi, Pakistan, in March 1993^{^[70]}. Molavi Abdolmalek Mollazadeh, (the brother of Molavi Ali Akbar Mollazadeh quoted above and the son of a prominent Baluchi Sunni cleric) was killed in suspicious circumstances in Pakistan in 1996 along with an associate, Abdolnasser Jamshid Zahi^{^[71]}. They were reportedly shot dead in the street in the Liari district of Karachi by unknown individuals who were passing in a taxi. Molavi Ahmad Sayyad, a Sunni leader of Baluchi origin, died in unclear circumstances after being arrested by Iranian security forces at Bandar Abbas airport in January 1997 on his return from the United Arab Emirates. His body was found outside the city five days later. He had previously been arrested in 1990 and apparently detained without trial for five years on account of his religious beliefs and perceived close relationship with Saudi Arabia. After his release from detention he had opened a school for Sunni Muslims in Sistan-Baluchistan^{^[72]}. In a letter to the former UN Special Representative on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian authorities said that Molavi Ahmad Sayyad had “died in a bus station” and that the “Forensic Department [had] confirmed that he had died of heart failure”[73]. Aman Naroui, a Sunni cleric from Zabol, was killed in July 1998 by unidentified gunmen, following his criticism of government policies in the region. His death is not known to have been investigated by the Iranian authorities^{^[74]}.

Text Box:
Molavi Ahmad Sayyad, found
dead after being arrested by
Iranian security forces in 1997‎
‎ © ‎www.taftaan.mihanblog.com

In recent years, notwithstanding the cautious cultural openings permitted to Baluchis, widespread allegations of human rights violations against Baluchis have been reported in the context of the official response to a deteriorating security situation in Baluchi areas.

4.1 Military response

For many years, the east of the country has had a heavy military presence. This increased further after the “Tasuki incident” (see above). A small force known as Mersad (Ambush), which has reportedly been based in Kerman province since 1995 to counter drug-smuggling,^{^[75]} was expanded into a joint operational unit of various security forces with a base near Zahedan. Baluchi sources allege that this unit has a remit to maintain security by instilling fear in the local community and is thus empowered to commit serious human rights violations, such as unlawful killings and torture, with impunity. In 1998 the commander of the Mersad garrison reportedly said, “We have not been given orders to arrest and hand over those who carry weapons. On the basis of a directive we have received, we will execute any bandits, wherever we capture them.”^{^[76]}

In April 2006, the Rasoul-e Akram military base was set up in Zahedan, intended to co-ordinate the efforts of police, military and other security agencies in the area, following the “Tasuki incident”. This apparently followed the establishment of a “security council”^{^[77]} in the province. The Rasoul-e Akram military base is believed to be the main base for an expanded Mersad unit in Sistan-Baluchistan, currently estimated to number between 20,000 and 25,000 troops.^{^[78]}

In June 2006, Brigadier-General Qasem Reza’i, then acting commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Force at the Rasoul-e Akram base, told IRNA:

“This military base transcends military and national boundaries in that the forces that are based in it are from the Army, the [Islamic Revolution] Guards Corps, the army aviation unit [havaniruz], the Bassij [a volunteer paramilitary force under the control of the Revolutionary Guard Corps] and the Law Enforcement Force…[The] Military Base began its activities two months ago, in the space of which, it set up and activated five bases under its command in the province. It is currently engaged in preparing armed brigades to become operational.”^{^[79]}

In August 2006, the same commander said that one of the main functions of the base was to stop drug-smuggling in eastern parts of Hormozgan province, and in Kerman, South Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan provinces. He said that “forward operating bases have been established in the region, paramilitary [Bassij] camps are being set up, and friendly tribes will be used”, and stressed that the authorities had “strengthened the intelligence system of the region.”^{^[80]} He also announced plans to block a 70-km stretch of the border with Pakistan with a trench that is 5m wide and 4m deep, with electronic monitoring, and with armed patrols.

In November 2006, Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), while visiting the Rasoul-e Akram base announced that UNODC would make a US$22 million contribution to Iran. He said the funds were intended to strengthen the eastern border against drug traffickers and for intelligence activities by police in that part of the country.[81]

4.2 Judicial response

In May 2006, Hojjatoleslam val Moslemin Mohammad Ebrahim Nekunam, a judge who was the Prosecutor for the Special Court for the Clergy before being appointed Deputy Prosecutor-General, was appointed adviser to the Chairman of the Judiciary and the Managing Director of the Administration of Justice of Sistan-Baluchistan province.^{^[82]} The same month Brigadier-General Qasem Reza’i announced that a special court was being established in the east of the country. He said:

“Establishing this court at the same time as the eastern base is starting its work will step up the process of confronting the bandits, and imposing penalties that suit the committed crimes will certainly have an important role in controlling crime.”^{^[83]}

Seyyed Mohsen Sadeqi, the Deputy Governor in charge of political and security affairs in Sistan-Baluchistan province, referred to this court in June 2006 when he said:

“[t]he establishment of the Rasoul-e Akram Military Base, the operation of the bases and brigades under its command in their decisive fight against lawless elements and those who undermine security, the activities of a special court dealing with security offences, the judicial system's firm stand against crime and the intensification of security measures, have all contributed to make people feel more secure and tranquil.”^{^[84]}

The same month Hojjatoleslam Nekunam was reported as saying that a “special judicial complex for security affairs” had begun work to deal with “mischief, insecurity, hostage taking, kidnapping, banditry, road blocking, armed robbery, major and networked drug, weapons and ammunition smuggling and any turbulence and insecurity”. He said that a recommendation had been made to the Judiciary to establish a branch of the Supreme Court in the complex in order to expedite the implementation of sentences and to reduce the time between the commission of crimes and the implementation of sentences. He added:

“The judicial organization is restricted and assigned to enforce the divine and Islamic limits. Ethnicism, religion and views do not bring any difference to investigation.”

The same article said that the complex had begun work with one examining magistrate and two assistant prosecutors.^{^[85]}

Later in June 2006, when announcing the execution of six people for violating religious laws,^{^[86]} Hojjatoleslam Nekunam noted local problems and said there were efforts under way to overcome them:

“The administration and judicial systems of the province are inefficient. There are many system blockages. But despite all these problems, we will use all our power in order to solve them. There is no doubt that, with the attention of the [head] of the Judiciary and the eminent leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] to this province, the religious orders will be executed as fast as possible.”^{^[87]}

Amnesty International has no other information about this court or the procedures under which it operates. It is unclear whether the court operates as a branch of the Revolutionary Court and is thus governed by the General and Revolutionary Court procedures, or whether it is a special court operating outside that framework, such as a military or other extraordinary court. The organization wrote to the Head of the Judiciary in July 2007 seeking further information, including clarifications regarding the court’s mandate, procedures and composition, including any process of appeal and sought statistics about the operation of this court since its establishment, such as the number of cases which have been brought before it, types of cases and the charges, the number of people convicted by it, the number of people sentenced to death by it, and the number executed following convictions in this court. Amnesty International had received no response by August 2007. The establishment of this court also coincides with a marked rise in the number of Baluchis reported executed in Iran (see Section 4.4 below).

Amnesty International is concerned that procedures before this court, like those before other courts in Iran such as the Special Court for the Clergy, fall far short of international standards relating to fair trial, such as those laid down in the ICCPR, to which Iran is a state party. The scanty information available about the trials of some Baluchis who have been arrested, tried and executed in a matter of days, and the large numbers of Baluchis who have been executed since the establishment of the court in May 2006, along with Hojjatoleslam Nekunam’s statements regarding the necessity for speedy implementation of sentences, seemingly without regard to the right of appeal, and the need to solve “system blockages” give rise to serious concerns that fair trial procedures are being flouted in the special court for security offences. Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the unfairness of procedures before that court, given that the death penalty is a possible sentence and carries with it particular international obligations regarding fair trial rights of accused persons. Any death sentence carried out after an unfair trial amounts to arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.

The Iranian authorities have an obligation under international law to ensure fair trials to all persons brought before the justice system (see box in Section 4.5 below on minimum standards for fair trial). The Human Rights Committee, responsible for overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR, has stated that “article 14 applies not only to procedures for the determination of criminal charges against individuals but also to procedures to determine their rights and obligations in a suit at law.” The Committee has further warned against “the existence … of military or special courts which try civilians. This could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of justice.”^{^[88]}

The Human Rights Committee has also stated that fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, are peremptory norms of international law. These are norms that apply to all states at all times, and from which states cannot at any time derogate. The Committee added that the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency. Although Iran does not have a state of emergency, this comment reflects the importance of respect to rule of law, legality and fair trials at all times.^{^[89]}

4.3 Killings and arrests by security forces

Following the December 2005 motorcade attack in which eight security officials were taken hostage, the “Tasuki incident” in March 2006, and the attack in Kerman in May 2006, Amnesty International received the following information about human rights violations or possible violations against Baluchis:

§ Three youths -- Abdollah Nouti Zahi, aged 15; Ruhollah Nouti Zahi, aged 16; and Masoud Shebaksh, aged 18 -- were shot dead by Iranian security officials shortly after 9:00pm on 22 January 2006 in Zahedan. They were returning from visiting their uncle in hospital when Iranian security officials in a car fired on them as they were travelling by motorbike along Khorramshahr Avenue. They fell into the road injured and were then shot again by the security officials. Abdollah Nouti Zahi and Masoud Shebaksh died at the scene; Ruhollah Nouti Zahi was taken to hospital but died later.

§ Text Box:

Molavi Abdolrahman ‎
Rajabi ‎
‎© www.sunnionline.ir Mowlavi Abdolrahman Rajabi, Sunni muezzin of the Makki mosque in Zahedan, was reportedly shot at by a guard of the Bassij on 14 May 2006, the day after the event in Kerman province in which 12 civilians were killed, for which the government said that Jondallah was responsible. The shot was fired while he was passing the Bassij building in Khayam Street at about 03:10am while on his way to make the call to prayer. He was not injured although the guard fired from only a few metres away. Subsequently, he complained to the local commanders of the Bassij and to the Bassij Headquarters and asked that the incident be investigated, but is not known to have received a response^{^[90]}.

§ At least ten people were reportedly killed by Iranian security forces in May 2006. Following the killing of the 12 civilians in Kerman province on 13 May, Iranian security forces reportedly launched a counter-insurgency operation in Baluchi areas near Bam and Nosratabad involving aerial attacks with helicopter gunships. On 17 May, Kerman’s Deputy Governor-General announced that “four operational battalions from the Law Enforcement Police and some army and security units” had “surrounded the terrorists” in a region bordering Kerman and Sistan-Baluchistan provinces.[91] The Governor of Bam had announced the previous day that at least 10 people not involved in the 13 May attack had been killed during the aerial operation,[92] while Baluchi sources reported that at least 18 people, mostly farmers or shepherds, had been killed by fire from helicopter gunships^{^[93]}.

§ Following the so-called Tasuki incident, Baluchi opposition groups alleged that over 200 Baluchis were detained by Iranian security forces and taken to unknown locations, raising concerns about their safety. Official statements indicated that more than 100 people were arrested in Sistan-Baluchistan province in the weeks following the start of the Iranian New Year, 21 March 2006. For example, on 9 May, Mohsen Sadeqi, Deputy Governor-General of Sistan-Baluchistan province, told ISNA that 124 people had been arrested in the province since the start of the year for “offences of armed blockade of roads, abduction, theft and armed robbery”[94]. The same article reported that Brigadier General Javad Hamed, Commander of the province’s Law Enforcement Force, had announced the arrest of two people -- identified as Reza A, aged 20, and Amanollah Z, aged 35 – for suspected “co-operation with the terrorist mini-group” responsible for the Tasuki attack. In April 2007, the Minister of the Interior said that 40 members of “the terrorist grouplet behind the Zabol-Zahedan [Tasuki] incident” had been identified, 17 of whom had been executed, or killed during clashes and operations. He also said, “The Interior Ministry admits that there was a failure to act promptly in [the] Tasuki incident and therefore the officials of the nearby checkpoint have been handed to the court. Some of those officials have been convicted and a number of others are being tried.”^{^[95]}

Amnesty International enquired about all these cases in correspondence with the Iranian authorities in December 2006 and sought information about any investigations that may have been carried out into the first four incidents. The organization also sought details of anyone detained in connection with security incidents in Sistan-Baluchistan province and called for all detainees to be granted access to their families, a lawyer of their choice and to any necessary medical treatment, and for them to be tried promptly and fairly on recognizably criminal offences, or released.

Following the December 2006 bombings in Zahedan and the February 2007 bus bombing, the authorities announced scores of arrests. For example, on 12 April 2007, Keyhan reported that the Minister of Intelligence had announced the arrest of 90 alleged members of Jondallah near the border with Pakistan, of whom four had been preparing for armed action. On 24 April, the Interior Minister stated that 174 “armed villains, murderers and fugitive thieves” had been arrested in the south and southeast of Kerman province. He said that six others had been killed during the operation. At least two people have been executed after conviction of involvement in the bombing (see below). Baluchi sources say that some of those detained were subjected to enforced disappearance. There have also been reports of unlawful killings by the security forces.

Text Box:
Vahid Mir Baluchzahi © ‎Radio ‎
‎ Baloch FM‎ Vahid Mir Baluchzahi, aged 23, was reportedly found dead in Zahedan on 13 June 2007^{^[96]}. He went missing on 14 February 2007, the day of the bus bombing, after he had left his home by car upon hearing the explosions. His family apparently made strenuous efforts to locate him, to no avail. His body reportedly bore injuries suggesting that he had been tortured before death, but no investigation is known to have been initiated. Amnesty International wrote to the Iranian authorities in August 2007 urging that Vahid Mir Baluch’s death be investigated.

Text Box:
Roya Sorani © Private ‎ According to eyewitnesses, Roya Sarani, aged 11, was shot dead in a street in Zahedan at about 5:30pm on 16 May 2007 after leaving a school examination. Her father, Haji Ghader Sarani, was driving her and her brother Elyas home from school, when members of Section 19 (said to be the intelligence section) of the Law Enforcement Force (LEF), stopped their Peugeot 405 car at the end of Bargh Boulevard in Zahedan. Haji Ghader Sarani tried to explain to the LEF officers that he was merely driving his children home from school, but the officers paid no heed to him and opened fire on him and the car. Elyas Sarani was reportedly wounded, and required hospitalization, whereas Roya Sarani was killed on the spot. Her family was reportedly put under pressure by the authorities to hold a quiet funeral and not to allow others to attend. Her family may have received condolences from local Iranian officials, but that no formal investigation is known to have been launched into her death and the wounding of her brother. Amnesty International wrote to the Iranian authorities in July 2007, without response.

Six members of the Voice of Justice Young People’s Society, a recognized non-governmental organization with accreditation from the National Youth Organization, were reportedly arrested in early May 2007. The Head of the Association, Ya’qub Mehrnehad, was reportedly arrested after attending a meeting in the Provincial Office of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which the Governor of Zahedan reportedly attended^{^[97]}. It is not known if the other five also attended that meeting. Three (identified only as Sangak Zahi, Khane Gir and Reza Qazzaq) were reportedly released several days later^{^[98]}, while Ebrahim Mehrnehad and Nasir Brahoui were released around 7 July 2007^{^[99]} but Ya’qub Mehrnehad is believed to remain in detention, apparently without access to family members or a lawyer of his choice. It is not known if he and those released have been charged, although some newspaper reports in July said that a man identified as Ya’qub M. was being detained on suspicion of “aiding Abdolmalek Rigi”, the head of Jondallah^{^[100]}.

International standards relating to the use of force and arrest and detention

Some of these cases suggest that the Iranian authorities may have been responsible for violating key international human rights standards, notably the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life. This right is embodied in many international standards including article 6 (1) of the ICCPR. Commenting on this, the Human Rights Committee has emphasised that the right to life is a “supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”^{^[101]} The Committee has stressed that States must “take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities.”^{^[102]}

The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials^{^[103]} stresses that such officials are under the obligation to respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons in the performance of their duties (Article 2). They may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty (Article 3). The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials require that law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, “shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.” (Principle 4).^{^[104]} The Basic Principles require that use of force or fire arms must not only be lawful, but also unavoidable. In such a case, law enforcement officials shall, among other things, “(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; and (b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life”. (Principle 5).

The authorities in Iran are also obliged to uphold Article 9 of the ICCPR, which states:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.